# Round 1 vs. UTSA CR (Neg)

## 1NC

### Framework

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### D. Best for education:

#### 1. Their infatuation to theoretical purity makes political and institutional engagement impossible. Political engagement is always cast against the theoretical purity of abstract philosophizing. This also turns their argument because, despite their radical aspirations, critique smuggles metaphysical distinctions between thinking and acting, purity and impurity, and truth and falsity into the judge’s decisionmaking calculus.

Yar 2k (Majid, Ph.D in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, “Arendt's Heideggerianism: Contours of a `Postmetaphysical' Political Theory?,” *Cultural Values*, Volume 4, Issue 1, January, Academic Search Complete)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.[21]

#### 2. The political *is* value to life—it is how originally solipsistic lives become incarnate and real to themselves.

Arendt 1958 [Hannah, *The Human Condition*, pp. 196-199]

The original, prephilosophic Greek remedy for this frailty had been the foundation of the polis. The polis, as it grew out of and remained rooted in the Greek pre-polis experience and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together (syzen), namely, the "sharing of words and deeds,"26 had a twofold function. First, it was intended to enable men to do permanently, albeit under certain restrictions, what otherwise had been possible only as an extraordinary and infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their households. The polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win "immortal fame," that is, to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness. One, if not the chief, reason for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as for the hardly less surprising swift decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life. The second function of the polls, again closely connected with the hazards of action as experienced before its coming into being, was to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become "immortal," were not very good. Homer was not only a shining example of the poet's political function, and therefore the "educator of all Hellas"; the very fact that so great an enterprise as the Trojan War could have been forgotten without a poet to immortalize it several hundred years later offered only too good an example of what could happen to human greatness if it had nothing but poets to rely on for its permanence. We are not concerned here with the historical causes for the rise of the Greek city-state; what the Greeks themselves thought of it and its ralson d'etre, they have made unmistakably clear. The polis-—if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their daring will not remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to praise them; without assistance from others, those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future ages.27 In other words, men's life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made "products," the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws—lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition is a kind of organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance and therefore needed Homer and "others of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there. According to this self-interpretation, the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the "sharing of words and deeds." Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing public space which, however, without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the moment of action and speech itself. Not historically, of course, but speaking metaphorically and theoretically, it is as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homesteads. The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. "Wherever you go, you will be a polis": these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. This space does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them—like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world—do not live in it. No man, moreover, can live in it all the time. To be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; "for what appears to all, this we call Being,"28 and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.29

#### 3. No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

### Cap K

#### Using imperialism as a focus point kills any chance at change —capital is transnational and imperialism is a byproduct - this ends any chance at a perm and makes the impacts worse by affirming institutions of global capital.

Robinson 7 (Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, William, 2007, “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 9-16, RSR)

Harvey offers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom.” 17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may influence a reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism. The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions. But instead of offering an ontology of agency and how it operates through historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” literature reifies these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is, codified – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure different aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE 18 have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the inter-state system). The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.” 20 But Harvey does not stop with this reification of the state. He introduces an additional territorial reification, so that territorial relations become immanent to social relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others,” writes Harvey. 21 This is a remarkably reii ed image – “territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular institutional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they transnationalize. Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) fixes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system. 22 But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fixes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of asymmetric exchanges that by i at gives them a territorial expression; no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place between distinct territories, much less specifically between distinct nation states. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-dei ned relations. But this territorialization is in no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in significance as globalization advances. Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of flows” replacing the “space of place.” 23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lifting” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction. 24 This notion of ongoing and novel reconfigurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfiguration of social relations beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond territory. States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by definition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to explain such behavior since by his definition the US state must promote its own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free flow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.” 25 In the same vein we can argue that the free flow of capital across global space alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale. Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globalization has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century must be explained by theoretical i at in these terms. Reality must be made to conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state. Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fits this frame one way or another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey has trapped himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an effort to open up space vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation reflects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

#### Privileging discourse and ideas guarantees mystifying the material conditions that cause class oppression – only a return to material criticism can confront the material oppression of global capitalism

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.3-4, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

Berube's lesson obscures this CIA which is an extension of U.S. corporations and whose task is to wage a clandestine class war against the working people of the world to keep the world safe for U.s. investment. There is no hint in his teaching of the event that the CIA's actions might be symptoms of the systematic aggression of market forces against the workers and that the event might be an outcome ofmarket forces. In his teaching, the CIA becomes a story machine producing absorbing stories that circle around personalities, places, and actions but lead nowhere. They build an illusion of knowing. Analysis ofthe economic role ofthe CIA (which produces material knowledge of global relations) is ob- structed by details that have no analytical effect. Why, for instance, did the CIA fight to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan? Berube's "waging the cold war" seems to imply that the dynamic of the conflict is "ideology." The U.S. and the Soviets simply had two different "political" systems and cultures. Thus, in Berube's version ofhistory, it is natural that the CIA wanted to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan and increase the U.S.'s sphere of political and cultural power in the region. The conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is, in other words, a clash of ideas. Underlining his pedagogy is, in other words, a view of history as an expansionism of "power" (see Hardt and Negri) and as conflicts of "ideologies" (see Fukuyama). It is based on the notion that "discourse" and "ideas" shape the world since, ultimately, history itself is the discursive journey ofthe Soul toward a cultural and spiritual resolution of material contradictions. This theory mystifies history by displacing "class" (labor) with "ideas" and "discourse," and it consequently produces world history as a "clash of civilizations" that rewrites the world in the interest of the Euroamerican capitalism (see Huntington). According to the clash theory (which is the most popular interpretive axis o f 9/ 11), people do what they do because of their "culture" not because they exploit the labor of others (and live in comfort), or because their labor is exploited by others (and therefore they live in abj ect poverty). The event, in other words, is an instance of the clash of civilizations: culture ("values," "language," "religion," the "affective") did it. "They" hate "our" way of life ("Their 'values' clash with our 'values"'). Since "values" are transhistorical, the clash is spiritual, not material. But culture, didn't do it. Contrary to contemporary dogma (seeHall,"Central- ity"), culture is not autonomous; it is the bearer of economic interests. Cultural values are, to be clear, inversive: they are a spiritualization of material interests. Culture cannot solve the contradictions that develop at the point of production; it merely suspends them. Material contradictions can be solved only materially - namely, by the class struggles that would end the global regime of wage labor. The event is an unfolding of a material contradiction not a clash of civilizations. If teaching the event does not at least raise the possibility of a class understanding of it, the teaching is not pedagogy; it is ideology (as I outline it later in this essay).

#### The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

#### Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Epistemology doesn’t determine reality – we can have a flawed epistemology but still prescribe good actions.

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[Colin, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off” <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jird/jird_200703_v10n1_d.pdf>, p.43-46, accessed 10-22-11, TAP]

In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no. 10 Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging particular knowledge claims. I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege. But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim. The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations for one or other epistemological stance does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between. It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible. Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim about the existence of a certain number of cars can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate. Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can, in all cases, stop an object from existing. 11 Again, in some respects, my position might appear to be quite close to Kratochwil’s pragmatist alternative. After all, pragmatists generally argue that we should do what works. There are certainly aspects of Kratochwil’s position that do suggest some affinities with my notion of epistemological opportunism. Thus, for example, he argues that ‘each science provides its own court and judges the appropriateness of its own methods and practices’(Kratochwil 2007: 12). This is, indeed, the position scientific realists adopt in relation to epistemological and methodological matters, although Kratochwil seems to reject that scientific realism out of hand. 12 But it is not clear why each science would need to judge the appropriateness of its own methods and practices unless there are some fundamental ontological differences that distinguish the object of study; which is exactly why scientific realists insist that ontology forms the starting point of all enquiry, not the a priori commitment to a set of scientific methods. According to the positivist view of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms which, when taken together, constitute the ‘scientific method’. Although the various strands of positivism disagree over the exact form of these axioms, the need to define them is common to all versions (Halfpenny 1982). For scientific realists, on the other hand, there can be no ‘scientific method’because differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. This argument is embedded in the differing ontological domains that concern the individual sciences. Hence there can be no scientific method as such, since differing object domains will require methods appropriate to their study and a range of epistemological supports. Kratochwil’s position is very different. He accepts that we have to ‘search for viable criteria of assessment of our theories’(Kratochwil 2007: 1), but exactly which criteria does he suggest? First, he explicitly rejects the notion that the world itself will play any role, arguing that ‘if we recognize the constitutive nature of our concepts then we have to accept that we never ‘‘test’’ against the ‘‘real world’’ but only against other more or less-articulated theories’ (Kratochwil 2007: 3). The use of ‘never’is a very strong statement and seems to rule out any role for empirical research. 13 Of course, Kratochwil may argue that by ‘real world’he does not mean the world of experience but some Platonic realm beyond experience. But, in so doing, he would be aligning himself with the positivists who also denied the possibility of accessing reality beyond that which can be experienced. Equally, of course, the empirical is part of the real world even if it does not exhaust it. Ultimately I think Kratochwil, like the positivists, does treat the world as the ‘world of experience’. This means that he has a very philosophically idealist notion of the real world, which also means that rather than transcending the materialist/idealist dichotomy, he is clearly on one side of it. 14 There is, however, some confusion regarding this issue. For example, despite claiming that the objects of experience are the result of our constructions and interests, he also argues that no one really contests the claim that there is a common substratum to these objects (Kratochwil 2007: 6). Equally in previous work he has claimed that no one seriously doubts the existence of an independent world (Kratochwil 2000: 91). Given these claims, it seems that the point he is trying to make is the relatively uncontested idea that we describe the world in certain ways and that those descriptions play a role, perhaps even determine, in how we interact with the world. I know of no one who would object to this, but this is a long way from the claim that we construct objects in a physical sense, by describing them in particular ways, or that the world plays no role in terms of the assessment of our claims. To illustrate this issue he uses the example of a table, which he claims is something entirely different to a ‘physicist, the chemist, the cabinet maker, the user, or the art historian’(Kratochwil 2007: 6). Now, of course, how we use a table, or how we describe it is almost exclusively a matter of our discourses and interests. No one doubts this. Nor does anyone doubt that objects can be described in a number of differing ways. Yet the fact still remains that in order for any object to function as a table it needs to have a set of properties such that it can fulfill that role. Hence, we construct tables out of materials, such as wood, that have the properties of being able to support objects placed on them. No matter how creative we are within our community of rule-following scientists, we are not yet able to construct tables out of water. 15 Thus, the world itself simply cannot be discarded in the manner Kratochwil suggests. One can think of many such examples where the world does in a very real and important sense talk to us: penalizing any attempt to put out fires using petrol rather than water for example; attempting to run our cars by packing them with environmental waste; or attempting to feed the starving of the world on fresh air as opposed to substances that provide nutritional value. 16 If Kratochwil’s idealist metaphysics were correct, all of these should be possible as long as we have an interest in achieving them, and providing enough of a given community followed the rules governing this process. The nature of matter itself, however, seems to block this move, which, because we continuously interact with the material world, cannot be simply described, as Kratochwil does, as ‘irrelevant’(Kratochwil 2007: 6). In a very meaningful and practical sense the world does communicate with us, accepting or rejecting our attempts to fashion it in ways to suit our interests on the basis of its specific modes of being (Pickering 1995). Likewise, when physicists or chemists interact with a table they generally do so in terms of it being a table, to place computers on, etc. 17 Similarly, art historians also relate to tables as tables and only treat particular tables with additional properties as ‘art objects’. And it is not just any table that can function as a work of art, but only a table that does indeed possess certain properties that match it to the rules that determine what constitutes an ‘art object’. Without this, just about any table would do and the notion of forgery in art would be redundant. Of course, these issues are infinitely more complicated in the social world where existence is dependent upon language and concepts. 18 Nonetheless, even in this realm existential claims made by theorists in academia are not a necessary, or sufficient, element to bring social objects into being, and nor do academic claims to the contrary stop particular social objects from existing. Social objects existed long before institutionally located social scientists attempted to describe them. Equally, in order to transcend the materialism/idealism dichotomy, we should be wary of embracing too sharp a distinction between natural and social processes. Accordingly, it is the case that human patterns of behaviour are impacting on global environmental processes in ways we have yet to fully understand and these processes will continue irrespective of whether we reach an intersubjective agreement on what they mean. And, of course, these same human-influenced processes will react back on social life in unforeseen ways, again often irrespective of our descriptions of them. 19

#### Prioritizing epistemology reifies, rewards extremism and causes self-serving scholarship.

Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California – San Diego, ‘11

[David, “Why ‘‘isms’’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress”, International Studies Quarterly, 2011, 55, 465-480, RSR]

The question of epistemology in international studies suffers from the same pathologies for theories outlined earlier, and which I need not repeat here. We reify each approach, reward extremism, fail to specify research designs completely, apply epistemologies selectively where they are most likely to work, and then claim universality. Through these pathologies, we not only create academic religions of different theories but also become committed to academic sects with different epistemologies. Like our theories, these epistemologies have become increasingly politicized and used as criteria and even weapons in power struggles within the discipline. Gatekeepers increasingly use one’s adherence to this or that epistemological religion to determine who gets hired where, who gets access to resources, and who is accepted in various professional networks. We increasingly talk and interact only with others of our same epistemological persuasion. Yet, although it may disappoint partisans, I can think of no objective reason to prefer one epistemology over another. Rather, the choice of epistemology by scholars appears to be largely subjective. We appear to be drawn to one or the other approach by intuition: one form of explanation simply feels right. Some are satisfied only when an event is placed in its full historical perspective with all the conjunctures and counterfactuals accounted for. Others are satisfied only when events accord with an appropriately derived hypothesis that has passed many demanding experimental tests. For myself, I read a lot in history—far more than I read in political science—and benefit from and enjoy these mostly narrative accounts immensely. But at the same time, I am usually not persuaded by causal claims that lack well-specified theories and experimental tests. In turn, while most of my own research has focused on the history of US foreign policy, the cases are treated within a nomological approach (see Lake 1988, 1999). One can move across the divide without finding the causal claims on the other side especially satisfying.

#### Images of suffering only create pity – which foregoes all opportunities to have any true relationship with the victims outline in 1ac

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 77-79]

We all know that newsmaking follows the lure of trouble, and broadcasting means telling about what has gone wrong. The only thing that catches people's attention is dramatic and shocking news, in the form of mass murders or catastrophes. The trouble is that the media also pretend they are presenting what is really going on. They pretend they are showing the real world. This leads to distortion, because people see foreign lands always as if they were full of dissidents fleeing dictators, pariahs, and the sickly. In the public mind forms an image of a world in disintegration, where life can subsist only by some miracle. This deformation of reality is not a momentary lapse or an ideological perversion; it seems to be a precondition for reporting the news. In the apparent truthfulness of journalism, where there seems to be no trickery or falsification, a subtle process is at work. Cruel and violent scenes shown almost nightly do not simply transmit real famines and obvious suffering. In the guise of facts, they objectify these things, and so a single moment in the life of a people is thought to be the sum of their life. The periodic sufferings of some tropical republic or the seasonal malnutrition of some region in Africa symbolize the constant and timeless anguish of continents beyond Europe. What can be concluded from these images? They are honest and guileless, but above all they are stereotypes. In their desire to move us emotionally, the newsmakers produce poverty as the single truth of underdeveloped countries, and newscasting assumes the character of testimony. The image we see, therefore, is both a copy and a model of reality. It reflects real events that are presented as the prototypes of all events. This is a double deception, because the camera denies that life "over there" is anything but a long cry of the oppressed. With regard to our far-off brothers, it means that happiness is a pathological symptom. Compassion is no longer one of the arms of charity, it has become a tool of geography. If, in spite of terrible difficulties, Indians, Thais, Koreans, Angolans, and West Africans feel joy, if those men and women are brought together by laughter and love exactly the way we are, if these people refuse to be defined by our compassionate view of them, it can only be a sign of corruption or of subversion by imperialist propaganda.83 Man in the Third World is either a victim or a warrior, [he] is caught in a logic of martyrdom or warfare, and has no right to exist except as a rebel or as one repressed. His reaction can only be one of depression or of outrage; there is no middle ground. A happy native is a contradiction in terms, a squared circle. It is much better to depict him as bent down in a valley of tears, and to mourn his loss of liberty by weeping over him. This law of compassion precludes any real relationship with him, and forbids free rein to feelings such as anger, admiration, mistrust, and fascination. It is so much easier to sympathize abstractly with unhappy people, because sympathy with happy people requires more nobility of the soul, because it makes us fight against the obstacle of jealousy within us: “If man is capable of having compassion for the sufferings of others, only Angels share in others' joys. . . . " The Southern hemisphere is presented in a true, but one-sided way; at the same time, it is raised to the level of a symbol, and this false projection is hailed as a "new" and "revolutionary" perspective. This is defining what the Third World should be, and the act of definition gives it the power of a moral principle, the quality of liberation. So the new crusaders, under the pretext of mobilizing the conscience of the Western World and showing the misdeeds we are guilty of, are pouring out stereotypes that are just as naive as the reports of Loti, Colette, and Paul Morand were in their day. The leftists portray the poor countries in shades just as stereotypically dark as the pamphlets of the colonial era were stereotypically rosy. Whom are we supposed to believe? The spokesmen of multinational corporations that are quietly pillaging the Southern hemisphere? Or the querulous leftists who value man in the Third World only as poor, crushed, and wretched? Where is the prejudice greater? Is it in the curses heaped on the Southern hemisphere by the adherents of Raymond Cartier, or in the tearful image the so-called sympathizers present? It comes down to asking the far-off "other" what kind of subjugation he prefers—strangulation by neocolonialism or routinization through pity. This is a hopeless choice, and represents nothing but two aspects of the Western imagination.

The act of pity takes out solvency

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 49-50]

The result is a terrible paradox. The more widespread hunger is, the greater is our indifference to its ravages. Pathetic appeals to our conscience and manipulation by shock are reiterated by the tireless television. The phrase "You are all murderers" does not mobilize people, it makes them yawn. What remains is a guilty conscience that has no strength and no will. We have passed from being tragically ignorant of the Third World to being tragically inured to it. When it was not normally mentioned, famine was deeply touching whenever it was. What is remarkable today is that it is too well known, too much a part of the norm. Rather than a blackout there is a welter of studies, statistics, and calls to alarm on these burning topics. Our emotional appetites are beset from all sides, and rather than being misled by propaganda, we are being told far too much. When catastrophe becomes an everyday thing, it ceases to be catastrophe.

Their obsession with the Guilt of the West eliminates all value to life; culminates in self-destruction

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 63-66]

For the prophets of guilty conscience, the tireless sowers of discontent, this disquiet is not enough. They need to make us responsible for everything that goes wrong. Their trick is to confront us via the media with all the suffering of the human race, in the face of which the slightest gesture of generosity is an inadequate act of charity. This accounts for their ceaseless and frantic recourse to their favorite weapon, statistics—a veritable secular weapon of sin, a perfect arithmetic club. We are beaten with figures so monstrous, quantities of suffering so enormous, that we hardly dare breathe. The panoramic road show of worldwide suffering has come knocking on our door. Everything is reduced to a sum of afflictions, in the face of which our existence seems obscene. Here are some examples: “In India, somebody dies of tuberculosis every minute.30 One Frenchman consumes as much energy as 46 Nigerians, 20 Indonesians, 10 Ecuadoreans, six Algerians and three Iranians.31 The inhabitants of the wealthy countries, thanks to their buying power, give almost as much grain to their animals as the amount eaten by all the inhabitants of the Third World put together (not including China).32 The landless peasants of the Third World have less disposable income than a cow in Normandy, a pig in Brittany, and a house cat in Paris, and, therefore, are less well-fed.33 Throughout the world, reason is stultified along with brotherhood and dignity. Narrowly perceived group interests are more important than the general interest, and thus sow the seeds of bloody confrontations and condemn a billion human beings to living on a yearly wage that is lower than what some spoiled brats in our country spend in a single weekend.34 The price of a night in a hotel room for American tourists in Cancun is equivalent to twice the annual wage of the average citizen of Bangladesh.35 In California feed lots, 100,000 steers being fattened eat 11/2 million pounds of corn every day, which would be enough to feed 1.7 million East Africans, or almost the entire population of Zambia.36 When I eat a half-pound steak, I could feed 30 people with the protein that was used to feed the animal.37 If you take six hours to read this book, by the time you have turned the last page, 2,500 people will have died of hunger or of hunger-related disease somewhere in the world.38” What is our wealth, in short? "A sort of economic Nazism created by a master race of the wealthy, who reign over a mass of undernourished people."39 After this, how can we fail to see ourselves as monsters devastated by shame?40 These are fallacious comparisons, of course, because they always fail to mention the different levels of industrialization that by themselves explain the huge differences in consumption between countries. When socioeconomic conditions are radically different, precise figures lose all validity and serve no purpose other than for slogans and reproaches. But there is no value in pointing out the uselessness of this quantitative overkill. Excess is the enemy of precision, and overstatement is deceptive. Overabundance of numbers becomes the rule, and indignant speeches answer with millions of starving people and contemptuous citations of the record books, where the number of hungry people is listed alongside the largest number of sausages, the longest kiss, the highest hairdo, and so on. These statistics pretend to be encyclopedias of suffering, packages of agony,'" and the officious indicators of one sole message: We are all parasites and cannibals.42 Suffering humanity is placed on a scale and, on balance, the West is portrayed as worthless. Our way of life is put in numerical terms in order to ridicule it. The reasoning behind our scolding Third World-lovers is that, the less we suffer, the more we must feel responsible. An elaborate, ramshackle, logical system that tries to establish a causal link, no matter how far-fetched, is set up between myself and this suffering. Highly technical explanations are worked out to demonstrate that, in the final analysis, it is still Europe that pulls the strings.43 It is like the world of a detective story, the infallible deduction that unravels the problems f hunger like Sherlock Holmes: “Who is guilty of these massacres that fill the morgues of the Third World every day? Is it mere fate? Are these men, women, and children the victims of uncontrollable and recurring natural disasters? No. For every victim, there is a murderer.” Thenceforth, all of us, young and old, are at fault for what goes wrong on our unhappy planet.45 We are participating in the destruction of the world46—from agricultural breakthroughs to woodcutting technology47 to female circumcision.48 The West is the great and only guilty party to all the evils of the world. In sum, we are inhuman and criminal because we do not want others to exist, and the causes of famine lie before us on the dinner table. It makes no difference that this accusation cannot be proven. Guilt is an easy way of bridging distinctions and doing away with intermediaries, because it draws a pitiless red line between their poverty and our sated appetites. Remorse comes before wrongdoing, because our error is not in sinning but in existing. The mania of suspicion makes us guilty before the fact for the disintegration of Ghanaian society, for empty stores in Angola, for the rising prices in Central America, for clouds of locusts in black Africa, for hurricanes in the Caribbean, tribal warfare in New Guinea, and so on. Every study, every book on the Third World, whatever its subject, says the same thing. The guilt of the accused is confirmed, and more evidence is accumulated against him. They are like a storekeeper's books, where the long list of the evils of the Old World is neatly spelled out, while the merits of the Southern hemisphere stand out from the details of an implicit frame of reference that is never questioned. They are an exercise in malediction, which is supposed to make our horror grow as it convinces us all—salaried workers, professors, lawyers, laborers, truckdrivers—of our fundamental thievery. The reader himself is a convenient scoundrel. . . . Obsessive repetition takes the place of a concern for precision, because we have to make our own breast-beating offering for the suffering of the world. Duty, that nameless and insatiable goddess, conducts a Kafkaesque trial against Europeans. This is the bad faith of bad consciences—unable to give solace for one scourge or another in any real way, we accuse ourselves of being the cause. The old relationship between colonizer and colonized is endlessly atoned for, and we search for aftereffects of imperialism everywhere. We can thus mortify our flesh with delight because we know how rotten we are. The conclusion is that our very existence is an insult to the human race. We have only one duty—to wipe ourselves off the face of the earth. The future of the West is self-destruction.

## 2NC

### Cap K

#### Capitalism provides the better analysis of the creation of the border. Ever since the border was created Mexican immigrants have been allowed into the State for the purpose of providing cheap and expendable labor

Bach 78

(Robert L, former director of the Global Inclusion Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, *“Mexican Immigration and the American State,”* International Migration Review, Winter 1978, JSTOR)

The rise of the liberal state at the national level corresponds to the rapid incorporation of regions of Mexico and the U.S. into a single structure of accumulation. The commodity chains established earlier continued to expand both in number and volume as U.S. railroads extended into Mexico and Western commercial agriculture boomed (McWilliams, 1942). The flow of landless workers from Mexico also increased along the expanded commercial routes. Earlier migrations of Mexicans to Texas to work in the cotton fields and in basic processing plants were complemented by a larger volume of Mexican laborers moving to help construct and maintain the railroads (Dillingham Commission, 1911; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1939). Simultaneously, the development of refrigerated railroad cars and improved methods of food preservation fueled the expansion of Western agriculture. The demand for manual labor increased as irrigation expanded the amount of land available for cultivation (Reisler, 1976). This increased demand came mainly from that sector of capital which was tied closely to the market or had need of large amounts of manual labor. That is, from the earliest periods Mexican labor was involved in only a fragmented part of the total accumulation process. The demand for Mexican labor developed out of an expressed need for a particular type of worker; one that would work for low wages and did not make competitive demands on precious agricultural land (Clark, 1908). Japanese laborers were employed extensively throughout this period but their attempted organization and land settlement challenged the monopoly of the growers. Consequently, the growers' associations turned to the available Mexican Labor. It did not take long for the employers to recognize the importance of the ease at which Mexican labor could be deported or made to 'voluntarily' leave the area of employment (Department of Commerce and Labor, 1909). That is, the structural nature of the powerlessness of the Mexican laborer, based on the original exclusion at the border, was quickly realized. The growing demand for Mexican labor by commercial agriculture and competitive manufacturers first encountered problems with national reforms when the 1917 Immigration Act placed restrictions on the character of legal entries. The growers, of course, responded with outcries about the danger to continued agricultural production if the Mexican labor was not made available. The state intervened to facilitate accumulation as the Secretary of Labor issued a departmental order waiving the literacy test, head tax and contract labor clause. However, even though this state action served the direct interests of a particular sector of capital, the state was acting well within the framework of its liberal tendencies. The departmental order from the Labor Secretary invoked a clause of the national act that gave him the power to "issue rules and prescribe conditions ... to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission". The emerging liberal state continued to promote accumulation through greater regulation during World War I. The War gave the progressives an opportunity to intervene and regulate markets, including the labor market, within a framework of relative acquiescence from trade unions. In the Southwest, President Wilson authorized the Food Administration and the U.S. Employment Service to act as employers and contractors with Mexican workers as they crossed the border (Reisler, 1976). However, direct attempts by Southwest growers to have the immigration restrictions repealed were defeated. While the trade unions had accepted the temporary admissions during the war, they clearly opposed extensions after the War (American Federation of Labor, 1920)

#### Race and class are reproduced within capitalist relations – capitalism racializes subjects to force competition and divides social groups by obfuscating labor consciousness – this is a way to mask contradiction and maintain capital accumulation

San Juan 3 (E, Fullbright lecturer @ U of Leuven, Belgium, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation”, <http://clogic.eserver.org/2003/sanjuan.html>)

It seems obvious that racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. Class exploitation cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the **condition of possibility** for it. It is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination. 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens. Third, the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.

#### They misdiagnose imperialism—history proves that it is the result of global capital—traditional responses to imperialism fail.

Foster 5 (Editor of the Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon in Eugene, John Bellamy, September 2005, “Naked Imperialism”, Monthly Review,

http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm)

Numerous critics on the U.S. left have responded by declaring, in effect, “Let’s throw the bastards out.” The U.S. government under the Bush administration, so the argument goes, has been taken over by a neoconservative cabal that has imposed a new policy of militarism and imperialism. For example, University of California at Los Angeles sociologist Michael Mann argues at the end of his Incoherent Empire (2003) that “a neoconservative chicken-hawk coup...seized the White House and the Department of Defense” with George W. Bush’s rise to the presidency. For Mann the end solution is simply to “throw the militarists out of office.” The argument advanced here points to a different conclusion. U.S. militarism and imperialism have deep roots in U.S. history and the political-economic logic of capitalism. As even supporters of U.S. imperialism are now willing to admit, the United States has been an empire from its inception. “The United States,” Boot writes in “American Imperialism?,” “has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the ‘empire of liberty’ expanded across the continent.” Later the United States conquered and colonized lands overseas in the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the brutal Philippine-American War that immediately followed—justified as an attempt to exercise the “white man’s burden.” After the Second World War the United States and other major imperialist states relinquished their formal political empires, but retained informal economic empires backed up by the threat and not infrequently the reality of military intervention. The Cold War obscured this neocolonial reality but never entirely hid it. The growth of empire is neither peculiar to the United States nor a mere outgrowth of the policies of particular states. It is the systematic result of the entire history and logic of capitalism. Since its birth in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries capitalism has been a globally expansive system—one that is hierarchically divided between metropole and satellite, center and periphery. The objective of the imperialist system of today as in the past is to open up peripheral economies to investment from the core capitalist countries, thus ensuring both a continual supply of raw materials at low prices, and a net outflow of economic surplus from periphery to center of the world system. In addition, the third world is viewed as a source of cheap labor, constituting a global reserve army of labor. Economies of the periphery are structured to meet the external needs of the United States and the other core capitalist countries rather than their own internal needs. This has resulted (with a few notable exceptions) in conditions of unending dependency and debt peonage in the poorer regions of the world.

#### Second, their unique focus on American Imperialism misplaces resistance—colonialism occurs between elites, not nations—at best, the United States leads the interventionary phase of capital

Robinson 7 (Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, William, 2007, “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 18-23, RSR)

There are vital functions that the national state performs for transnational capital, among them, sets of local economic policies aimed at achieving macroeconomic equilibrium, the provision of property laws, infrastructure, and of course, social control and ideological reproduction. However, national states are ill equipped to organize a supranational unification of macroeconomic policies, create a unified field for transnational capital to operate, impose transnational trade regimes, supranational “transparency,” and so forth. The construction of a supranational legal and regulator system for the global economy in recent years has been the task of sets of transnational institutions whose policy prescriptions and actions have been synchronized with those of neo-liberal national state that have been captured by local transnationally-oriented forces. A transnational institutional structure has played an increasingly salient role in coordinating global capitalism and imposing capitalist domination beyond national borders. Clearly the IMF, by imposing a structural adjustment program that opens up a given country to the penetration of transnational capital, the subordination of local labor, and the extraction of wealth by transnational capitalists, is operating as a state institution to facilitate the exploitation of local labor by global capital. “New imperialism” dogma reduces these IMF practices to instruments of “US” imperialism. 30 Yet I know of no single IMF structural adjustment program that creates conditions in the intervened country that favors “US” capital in any special way, rather than opening up the intervened country, its labor and resources, to capitalists from any corner of the world. US foreign policy is exercised behind the backs of the public by state managers as proximate policymakers and politicized corporate elites that constitute the ruling class in the formal sense of the term. Nevertheless, state policymaking is also a process in which different factions and institutions that make up the state apparatus have influence over varied quotas of decision-making at given moments. Tactical and strategic differences as well as personal and institutional rivalries are played out at the level of proximate policymaking in disputes for control over policy. This diffusion of foreign policy making power within an elite and levels of (relative) autonomy among proximate policymakers can make moments of transition and redefinition appear highly contradictory and can confuse observers, especially when these observers that take public discourse at face value or assume that social actors are not inl uenced by ideologies that may be in contradiction with interests and underlying intent. The Crisis of Global Capitalism and the US State “US” imperialism refers to the use by transnational elites of the US state apparatus to continue to attempt to expand, defend and stabilize the global capitalist system. We face an empire of global capital, as I have argued elsewhere, 31 headquartered, for evident historical reasons, in Washington. The questions for global elites are: In what ways, under what particular conditions, arrangements, and strategies should US state power be wielded? How can particular sets of US state managers be responsive and held accountable to global elites who are fractious in their actions, dispersed around the world, and operating through numerous supranational institutional settings, each with distinct histories and particular trajectories? We are witness to new forms of global capitalist domination, whereby intervention is intended to create conditions favorable to the penetration of transnational capital and the renewed integration of the intervened region into the global system. US intervention facilitates a shift in power from locally and regionally-oriented elites to new groups more favorable to the transnational project. The result of US military conquest is not the creation of exclusive zones for “US” exploitation, as was the result of the Spanish conquest of Latin America, the British of South Africa and India, the Dutch of Indonesia, and so forth, in earlier moments of the world capitalist system. The enhanced class power of capital brought about by these changes is felt around the world. We see not a reenactment of this old imperialism but the colonization and recolonization of the vanquished for the new global capitalism and its agents. The underlying class relation between the TCC and the US national state needs to be understood in these terms. In sum, the US state has attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist interests. That it is increasingly unable to do so points not to heightened national rivalry but to the impossibility of the task at hand given a spiraling crisis of global capitalism. This crisis involves three interrelated dimensions. First is a crisis of social polarization. The system cannot meet the needs of a majority of humanity, or even assure minimal social reproduction. Second is a structural crisis of overaccumulation. The system cannot expand because the marginalization of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarization of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. The problem of surplus absorption makes state-driven military spending and the growth of military-industrial complexes an outlet for surplus and gives the current global order a built-in war drive. Third is a crisis of legitimacy and authority. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. This multidimensional crisis of global capitalism has generated intense discrepancies and disarray within the globalist ruling bloc. The opposition of France, Germany and other countries to the Iraq invasion indicated sharp tactical and strategic differences over how to respond to crisis, shore up the system, and keep it expanding. The political coherence of ruling groups always frays when faced with structural and/or legitimacy crises as different groups push distinct strategies and tactics or turn to the more immediate pursuit of sectoral interests. Faced with the increasingly dim prospects of constructing a viable transnational hegemony, in the Gramscian sense of a stable system of consensual domination, the transnational bourgeoisie has not collapsed back into the nation-state. Global elites have, instead, mustered up fragmented and at times incoherent responses involving heightened military coercion, the search for a post-Washington consensus, and acrimonious internal disputes. The more politically astute among global elites have clamored in recent years to promote a “post-Washington consensus” project of reform – a so-called “globalization with a human face” – in the interests of saving the system itself. 32 But there were other from within and outside of the bloc that called for more radical responses. Neo-liberalism “peacefully” forced open new areas for global capital in the 1980s and the 1990s. This was often accomplished through economic coercion alone, made possible by the structural power of the global economy over individual countries. But this structural power became less effective in the face of the three-pronged crisis mentioned above. Opportunities for both intensive and extensive expansion have been drying up as privatizations ran their course, the “socialist” countries became integrated, the consumption of high-income sectors worldwide reached ceilings, spending through private credit expansion could not be sustained, and so on. The space for “peaceful” expansion, both intensive and extensive, has become ever more restricted. Military aggression becomes an instrument for prying open new sectors and regions, for the forcible restructuring of space in order to further accumulation. The train of neo-liberalism became latched on to military intervention and the threat of coercive sanctions as a locomotive for pulling the moribund Washington consensus forward. The “war on terrorism” provides a seemingly endless military outlet for surplus capital, generates a colossal deficit that justifies the ever-deeper dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and locks neo-liberal austerity in place, and legitimates the creation of a police state to repress political dissent in the name of security. In the post 9/11 period the military dimension appears to exercise an over-determining influence in the reconfiguration of global politics. The Bush White House militarized social and economic contradictions, launching a permanent war mobilization to try to stabilize the system through direct coercion. Is this evidence for a new US bid for empire? We need to move beyond a conjunctural focus on the Bush regime to grasp the current moment and the US role in it. In this sense, interventionism and militarized globalization is less a campaign for US hegemony than a contradictory political response to the crisis of global capitalism – to economic stagnation, legitimation problems, and the rise of counterhegemonic forces. Despite the rhetoric of neo-liberalism, the US state is undertaking an almost unprecedented role in creating profit-making opportunities for transnational capital and pushing forward an accumulation process that let to its own devices (the “free market”) would likely ground to a halt. A Pentagon budget of nearly $500 billion in 2003, an invasion and occupation of Iraq with a price tag of over $300 billion by 2006 and a proposed multi billion dollar space program that would rest on a marriage of NASA, the military, and an array of private corporate interests must be seen in this light. Some have seen the $300 billion invested by the US state in the first three years of its Iraq invasion and occupation as evidence that the US intervention benei ts “US capital” to the detriment of other national – e.g., “EU” – capitals. However, Bechtel, the Carlyle Group, and Halliburton are themselves transnational capital conglomerates. 33 It is true that military, oil, and engineering/construction companies, many of them headquartered in the United States, have managed to secure their particular sectoral interests through brazen instrumentalization of the US state under the Bush presidency. However, these companies are themselves transnational and their interests are those not of “US capital” in rivalry with other countries but of particular transnational clusters in the global economy. The “creative destruction” of war (and natural and humanitarian disasters) generates new cycles of accumulation through “reconstruction.” And the military-energy-engineering-construction complex constitutes one of those sectors of global capital that most benefits from such “creative destruction.” Transnational capitalists are themselves aware of the role of the US state in opening up new possibilities for unloading of surplus and created new investment opportunities. “We’re looking for places to invest around the world,” explained one former executive of a Dutch-based oil exploration and engineering company, and then “you know, along comes Iraq.” 34 The $300 billion invested by the US state in war and “reconstruction” in Iraq between 2003 and 2006 went to a vast array of investors and sub contractors that spanned the globe. 35 Kuwaiti Trading and Contracting, Alargan Trading of Kuwait, Gulf Catering and Saudi Trading and Construction Company were just some of the Middle East-based companies that shared in the bonanza, along with companies and investor groups as far away as South Africa, Bosnia, the Philippines, and India. The picture that emerges is one in which the US state mobilizes the resources to feed a vast transnational network of profit making that passes through countless layers of outsourcing, subcontracting, alliances and collaborative relations, benefiting transnationally-oriented capitalists from many parts of the globe. The US state is the pivotal gear in a TNS machinery dedicated to reproducing global capitalism.

#### A focus on discourse is an abandonment of real change – we must use a materialist focus to solve oppression

Cloud 1 (Dana L. Cloud, Associate Professor, Communication Studies UT Austin, “The Affirmative Masquerade,” American Communication Journal, Volume 4, Issue 3, Spring 2001, <http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm>)

At the very least, however, it is clear that **poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind** some of **historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for** any **theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of** historically exploited and **oppressed groups**. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), **we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology** (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) **and fundamental, class-based interests** (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order** better **to inform the fight against them**.  In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to** understanding and **transforming** system and **structure at the level of the economy and the state**. **It** substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even **as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before**. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999).  Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates.  Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8).  **In this context of a real** (and clearly bipolar) **class divide in** late **capitalist society,** the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact **encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon** any **commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs** with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41).  Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience. Yet **Marxist theory is not naïve in** its **understanding** of intention or individual **agency**. Challenging individualist humanism, **Marxist** ideology **critics regard people as "products of circumstances**" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).  Within this understanding, **Marxist** ideology **critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses** such as that of racism or sexism **as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis**. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, **Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation** itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic.  Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique:   Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts **‘what is’ to explain how social differences**--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for** producing transformative knowledges**.** (p. 7)

#### The affirmative commodifies an essentialized notion of race to frame inequality, replicating racism and shattering class-based coalitions, ensuring the capitalist social relations that build the ghettoes and favells that imprison racialized populations become inevitable, turning the case

Darder and Torres 99 (Antonia Darder, Professor of Educational Policy Studies and Latino/a Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Rodolpho D. Torres, Professor of Planning, Policy & Design and Political Science at UC Irvine, “Shattering the ‘Race’ Lens: Toward a Critical Theory of Racism”, Chapter 7 of the book “Critical Ethnicity: Countering the Waves of Identity Politics”, edited by Robert H. Tai and Mary L. Kenyatta, p. 174-176)

Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among social science scholars to focus on notions of “race.” Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among a variety of critical scholars to focus on the concept of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization.’ As a consequence, much of the literature on subordinate cultural populations, with its emphasis on such issues as "racial inequality," "racial segregation," "racial identity," has utilized the construct of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization. ln turn, this literature has reinforced a racialized politics of identity and representation, with its problematic emphasis on "racial" identity as the overwhelming impulse for political action. This theoretical practice has led to serious analytical weaknesses and absence of depth in much of the historical and contemporary writings on racialized populations in this country. The politics of busing in the early 1970s provides an excellent example that illustrates this phenomenon. Social scientists studying "race relations" concluded that contact among "Black" and "White" students would improve "race relations" and the educational conditions of "Black" students if they were bused to "White" (better) schools outside their neighborhoods!” Thirty years later, many parents and educators adamantly denounce the busing solution (a solution based on a discourse of ”race") as not only fundamentally problematic to the fabric of African American and Chicano communities, but an erroneous social policy experiment that failed to substantially improve the overall academic performance of students in these communities. Given this legacy, it is not surprising to find that the theories, practices, and policies that have informed social science analysis of racialized populations today are overwhelmingly rooted in a politics of identity, an approach that is founded on parochial notions of "race" and representation which ignore the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the existence of class divisions within racialized subordinate populations. The folly of this position is critiqued by Ellen Meiksins Wood in her article entitled "Identity Crisis," where she exposes the limitations of a politics of identity which fails to contend with the fact that capitalism is the most totalizing system of social relations the world has ever known. Yet, in much of the work on African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian populations, an analysis of class and a critique of capitalism is conspicuously absent. And even when it is mentioned, the emphasis is primarily on an undifferentiated plurality of identity politics or an “intersection of oppressions," which, unfortunately, ignores the overwhelming tendency of capitalism to homogenize rather than to diversify human experience. Moreover, this practice is particularly disturbing since no matter where one travels around the world, there is no question that racism is integral to the process of capital accumulation. For example, the current socioeconomic conditions of Latinos and other racialized populations can be traced to the reletless emergence of the global economy and recent economic policies of expansion, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A recent United Nations report by the International Labor Organization conﬁrms the negative impact of globalization on racialized populations. By the end of 1998, it was projected that one billion workers would be unemployed. The people of Africa, China, and Latin America have been most affected by the current restructuring of capitalist development.“ This phenomenon of racialized capitalism is directly linked to the abusive practices and destructive impact of the “global factory’ '—a global ﬁnancial enterprise system that includes such transnational corporations as Coca Cola, Walmart, Disney, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors. In a recent speech on "global economic apartheid," John Cavanagh," co-executive director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., comments on the practices of the Ford Motor Company. The Ford Motor Company has its state-of-the-art assembly plant in Mexico . . . where because it can deny basic worker rights, it can pay one-tenth the wages and yet get the same quality and the same productivity in producing goods. . . .The same technologies by the way which are easing globalization are also primarily cutting more jobs than they're creating. The failure of scholars to confront this dimension in their analysis of contemporary society as a racialized phenomenon and their tendency to continue treating class as merely one of a multiplicity of (equally valid) perspectives, which may or may not "intersect" with the process of racialization, are serious shortcomings. In addressing this issue, we must recognize that identity politics, which generally gloss over class differences and/ or ignore class contradictions, have often been used by radical scholars and activists within African American, Latino, and other subordinate cultural communities in an effort to build a political base. Here, fabricated constructions of "race" are objectified and mediated as truth to ignite political support, divorced from the realities of class struggle. By so doing, they have unwittingly perpetuated the vacuous and dangerous notion that the political and economic are separate spheres of society which can function independently—a view that ﬁrmly anchors and sustains prevailing class relations of power in society.

####  Any ethical system created from within capitalism will be co-opted by it - their appeal to “ethics” is a distraction from class struggle

Red Critique 5 (Winter/Spring, “Left Populisms”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2005/leftpopulisms.htm>)

Having declared class dead, class politics a dead-end, and class analysis just plain boring (if not impossible), the Left has eagerly embraced the subtleties and nuances of “ethics”. Ethics, the Left has said, is necessary because scientific knowledge of class—which is necessary for any transformative politics—is the bête noire of freedom, democracy and difference. The ethical person, the Left insists, “recognizes” that there is, after all, no definite basis upon which to bring about fundamental transformation of class for social justice and economic equality. All that can be done is to act “ethically” within capitalism. Ethics, in other words, is the politics of conscientious capitulation to capital. The epitome of conscientious capitulation is the “lesser of two evils” and “anything but Bush” approach—now canonized in such films as Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, which has become the pinnacle of “left cinematherapy” in the face of brutal imperialist onslaught. Such an approach opportunistically proclaims “outrage” against Bush, the current face of the war and U.S. capital’s imperialist interests, only to replace it with a new, seemingly more “ethical” face that leaves intact the system of production for profit that produces the imperialist war economy. Ethics allows the left to see the war in Iraq as a scandal, but not the wars against Afghanistan and Yugoslavia (or Iran or North Korea, for that matter). The ethical Left opposes the moralist Christian fundamentalism and jingoistic nationalism of U.S.-based capital and supports a savvier but equally religious “global ethics” favoring U.S. capitalist interests that rely heavily on foreign investment. Which is to say that the left’s “ethical” values, like the Right’s religious and moral values, are no more than a translation of inter-capitalist competition into cultural values. Conscientious or not, they both leave working people, who now more than ever need an un-subtle politics to end exploitation, with no choice but to consent to the dictates of capital accumulation.

#### Intellectuals on the left have been critical in normalizing the economic structure of capitalism while criticizing the textures and contours of the system – they preclude the fundamental reality that all social dynamics rely on the mode of production and not the other way around.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh 8(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

Thecultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### The perm fails and causes extinction. Any inclusion of capitalism with the alt will fail because of the conflict in ideological orientation

Meszaros 7 (Istvan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Sussex, “The Only Viable Economy” The Monthly Review 58(11) APB

There can be not even partial correctives introduced into capital’s operational framework if they are genuinely quality-oriented. For the only qualities relevant in this respect are not some abstract physical characteristics but the humanly meaningful qualities inseparable from need. It is true, of course, as stressed before, that such qualities are always specific, corresponding to clearly identifiable particular human needs both of the individuals themselves and of their historically given and changing social relations. Accordingly, in their many sided specificity they constitute a coherent and well defined set of inviolable systemic determinations, with their own systemic limits. It is precisely the existence of such—very far from abstract—systemic limits which makes it impossible to transfer any meaningful operating determinations and orienting principles from the envisaged alternative social metabolic order into the capital system. The two systems are radically exclusive of each other. For the specific qualities corresponding to human need, in the alternative order, carry the indelible marks of their overall systemic determinations, as integral parts of a humanly valid social reproductive system of control. In the capital system, on the contrary, the overall determinations must be unalterably abstract, because capital’s value relation must reduce all qualities (corresponding to need and use) to measurable generic quantities, in order to assert its alienating historical dominance over everything, in the interest of capital expansion, irrespective of the consequences. The incompatibilities of the two systems become amply clear when we consider their relationship to the question of limit itself. The only sustainable growth positively promoted under the alternative social metabolic control is based on the conscious acceptance of the limits whose violation would imperil the realization of the chosen—and humanly valid—reproductive objectives. Hence wastefulness and destructiveness (as clearly identified limiting concepts) are absolutely excluded by the consciously accepted systemic determinations themselves, adopted by the social individuals as their vital orienting principles. By contrast, the capital system is characterized, and fatefully driven, by the—conscious or unconscious—rejection of all limits, including its own systemic limits. Even the latter are arbitrarily and dangerously treated as if they were nothing more than always superable contingent obstacles. Hence anything goes in this social reproductive system, including the possibility—and by the time we have reached our own historical epoch also the overwhelming grave probability—of total destruction. Naturally, this mutually exclusive relationship to the question of limits prevails also the other way round. Thus, there can be no “partial correctives” borrowed from the capital system when creating and strengthening the alternative social metabolic order. The partial—not to mention general—incompatibilities of the two systems arise from the radical incompatibility of their value dimension. As mentioned above, this is why the particular value determinations and relations of the alternative order could not be transferred into capital’s social metabolic framework for the purpose of improving it, as postulated by some utterly unreal reformist design, wedded to the vacuous methodology of “little by little.” For even the smallest partial relations of the alternative system are deeply embedded in the general value determinations of an overall framework of human needs whose inviolable elementary axiom is the radical exclusion of waste and destruction, in accord with its innermost nature. At the same time, on the other side, no partial “correctives” can be transferred from the operational framework of capital into a genuinely socialist order, as the disastrous failure of Gorbachev’s “market socialist” venture painfully and conclusively demonstrated. For also in that respect we would always be confronted by the radical incompatibility of value determinations, even if in that case the value involved is destructive counter value, corresponding to the ultimate—necessarily ignored—limits of the capital system itself. The systemic limits of capital are thoroughly compatible with waste and destruction. For such normative considerations can only be secondary to capital. More fundamental determinations must take the precedence over such concerns. This is why capital’s original indifference to waste and destruction (never a more positive posture than indifference) is turned into their most active promotion when conditions require that shift. In fact waste and destruction must be relentlessly pursued in this system in direct subordination to the imperative of capital expansion, the overwhelming systemic determinant. The more so the further we leave behind the historically ascending phase of the capital system’s development. And no one should be fooled by the fact that frequently the preponderant assertion of counter value is misrepresented and rationalized as “value neutrality” by capital’s celebrated ideologists.

#### Historical materialism is the best methodology for understanding and fighting capital- it recognizes that capitalism is not inevitable, overcomes the depoliticized nature of economics, and opens space for solidarity and human agency

Holmstrom 97 (Nancy, Professor Emeritus Department of Philosophy at Rutgers, Renewing Historical Materialism, Solidarity, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/2198)

Wood's interpretation of historical materialism has been pejoratively labeled "Political Marxism," but she is happy to appropriate the label. For she argues that Marx revealed what had been concealed by economists, that the essence of capitalist production is political in that it rests on the relations of power between those who own the means of production and those who do not. Political Marxism presents relations of production "in their political aspect, that aspect in which they are actually contested, as relations of domination . . . as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation . . . the object of this theoretical stance is practical, to illuminate the terrain of struggle by viewing modes of production not as abstract structures but as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them." (25) Thus Wood's stress (and Marx's) on politics and class struggle in historical explanation is not counterposed to a stress on the mode of production or the economic, but rather intends to reveal how deeply social and political these are. Wood aims to restore this insight to the center of historical and social analyses where it belongs. Most historians and social scientists have missed this point. Wood suggests that one important source of the prevalent defeatist sense that nothing other than capitalism is possible, is the idea that capitalism has always existed, which she shows to be implicit in many theories of history. Weber, for example, uses "the Protestant ethic" to explain the origins of capitalism, but unless a society is already a generalized market society and workers are already subordinated to capital, this ethic will not lead to the productivity and profit maximization characteristic of capitalism. So Weber's explanation begs the question of how capitalism comes into existence. Some Marxist theories of history make the same mistake. For example, John Roemer assumes that capitalism already existed "as an option" within feudalism, thereby, like Weber, begging the question of how capitalism came into being. In contrast to such theories, Wood cites approvingly Robert Brenner's work as stressing the specificity of each mode of production and looking to explain the transition to capitalism in terms of the dynamics, contradictions and struggles within pre-capitalist relations of production. Brenner's work helps to fill in the details of what Wood -- following Marx -- stresses is the crucial condition necessary for capitalism: the divorce of the actual producers from their conditions of reproduction, an historical transformation that is simultaneously economic, social and political. Another source of error in interpreting historical materialism lies in hanging too heavy a theoretical load on the metaphor of "base and superstructure," which Wood says was always more trouble than it was worth because it suggests separate self-enclosed spheres. This was worsened by Stalinist mechanical, usually technological, determinism. The standard alternative to mechanical determinist interpretations, however, was a vague humanism. E.P. Thompson's work is often portrayed as an example of the latter, but Wood sees him as her kind of Political Marxist. Wood argues that Thompson's work transcends these false dualisms, demonstrating that the economic is irreducibly social and political, consisting of human relations of exploitation and appropriation. [Thompson is most famous for The Making of the English Working Class, whose profound impact on a radical generation is recalled in tributes by Michael Lowy and Barbara Winslow, ATC 48, January-February 1994 -- ed.] Against Thompson's critics, such as Althusser, G.A. Cohen and Perry Anderson, Wood shows how his work consistently addresses the Marxist problem of how to give credence to both the logic of modes of production, and to human agency within the conditions set by those logics. The critics, she charges, are essentially ahistorical: They see no alternative to structural necessity except contingency, whereas Thompson sees "historical determinations, structured processes with human agencies." (78)

#### A materialist method is key - illumination of social and political relations through dialetical materialism is key to achieving class consciousness and thus stopping capitalism

Lukacs 1919 (George, Hungarian philosopher, He was the founder of Western Marxism, “What is Orthodox Marxism” http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm)

If the question were really to be formulated in terms of such a crude antithesis it would deserve at best a pitying smile. But in fact it is not (and never has been) quite so straightforward. Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious ‘orthodox’ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto – without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or ‘improve’ it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality and eclecticism. 1 Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic. This definition is so important and altogether so crucial for an understanding of its nature that if the problem is to be approached in the right way this must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of the dialectical method itself. The issue turns on the question of theory and practice. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that “theory becomes a material force when it grips the masses.” [[1]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#1) Even more to the point is the need to discover those features and definitions both of the theory and the ways of gripping the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. If this is not done that ‘gripping the masses’ could well turn out to be a will o’ the wisp. It might turn out that the masses were in the grip of quite different forces, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. In that event, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action. In the same essay [[2]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#2) Marx clearly defined the conditions in which a relation between theory and practice becomes possible. “It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must also strive towards thought.” Or, as he expresses it in an earlier work: [[3]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#3) “It will then be realised that the world has long since possessed something in the form of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality.” Only when consciousness stands in such a relation to reality can theory and practice be united. But for this to happen the emergence of consciousness must become the decisive step which the historical process must take towards its proper end (an end constituted by the wills of men, but neither dependent on human whim, nor the product of human invention). The historical function of theory is to make this step a practical possibility. Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself means that it understands society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes both the subject and the object of knowledge; in short, only when these conditions are all satisfied will the unity of theory and practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of the theory, become possible. Such a situation has in fact arisen with the entry of the proletariat into history. “When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing social order,” Marx declares, “it does no more than disclose the secret of its own existence, for it is the effective dissolution of that order.” [[4]](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/orthodox.htm#4) The links between the theory that affirms this and the revolution are not just arbitrary, nor are they particularly tortuous or open to misunderstanding. On the contrary, the theory is essentially the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself. In it every stage of the process becomes fixed so that it may be generalised, communicated, utilised and developed. Because the theory does nothing but arrest and make conscious each necessary step, it becomes at the same time the necessary premise of the following one.

#### Vote negative - as an intellectual your rejection has emancipatory results relentless criticism allows capitalism to be challenged.

Kovel 2 (Professor of Social Studies at Bard, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, p224)

Relentless criticism can delegitimate the system and release people into struggle. And as struggle develops, victories that are no more than incremental by their own terms- stopping a meeting stopping the IMF, the hopes stirred forth by a campaign such as Ralph Nader’s in 2000 – can have a symbolic effect far greater than their external result, and constitute points of rupture with capital. This rupture is not a set of facts added to our knowledge of the world, but a change in our relation to the world. Its effects are dynamic, not incremental, and like all genuine insights it changes the balance of forces and can propagate very swiftly. Thus the release from inertia can trigger a rapid cascade of changes, so that it could be said that the forces pressing towards radical change need not be linear and incremental, but can be exponential in character. In this way, conscientious and radical criticism of the given, even in advance of having blueprints for an alternative, can be a material force, because it can seize the mind of the masses of people. There is no greater responsibility for intellectuals

#### Rejecting the aff exposes the cracks within capitalism and open space for change

Holloway 5 [John Holloway Ph.D Political Science-University of Edinburgh and Alex Callinicos Ph.D Philosophy University of Oxford, former Professor of Politics- University of York August 16, 2005 <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5616>]

On the question of fissures. We often feel helpless because capitalism weighs so heavily on us. But when we say No we start off with an appreciation of our own strength. When we rebel we are in fact tearing a little hole in capitalism. It is very contradictory. By rebelling we are already saying no to the command of capital. We are creating temporary spaces. Within that crack, that fissure, it is important that we fight for other social relations that don't point towards the state, but that they point towards the sort of society we want to create. At the core of these fissures is the drive to self-determination. And then it is a question of working out what does this mean, and how to be organised for self-determination. It means being against and beyond the society that exists. Of expanding the fissures, how to push these fissures forward structurally. The people who say we should take control of the state are also talking about cracks. There is no choice but to start with interstices. The question is how we think of them, because the state is not the whole world. There are 200 states. If you seize control of one, it is still only a crack in capitalism. It is a question of how we think.

#### Capitalism is the root cause of racism

McLaren and Torres 99 (Peter Mclaren, professor of education at U of California, and Rudolfo Torres, Professor of Planning, Policy, and Design, Chicano/Latino Studies, and Political Science, “Racism and Multicultural Education: Rethinking ‘Race’ and ‘Whiteness’ in Late Capitalism”, Chapter 2 of “Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multicultural and Antiracist Education”, edited by Stephen May, p.49-50, Questia)

According to Alex Callinicos (1993), racial differences are invented. Racism occurs when the characteristics which justify discrimination are held to be inherent in the oppressed group. This form of oppression is peculiar to capitalist societies; it arises in the circumstances surrounding industrial capitalism and the attempt to acquire a large labour force. Callinicos points out three main conditions for the existence of racism as outlined by Marx: economic competition between workers; the appeal of racist ideology to white workers; and efforts of the capitalist class to establish and maintain racial divisions among workers. Capital's constantly changing demands for different kinds of labour can only be met through immigration. Callinicos remarks that 'racism offers for workers of the oppressing “race” the imaginary compensation for the exploitation they suffer of belonging to the “ruling nation”' (1993, p. 39). Callinicos notes the way in which Marx grasped how 'racial' divisions between 'native' and 'immigrant' workers could weaken the working-class. United States' politicians like Pat Buchanan, Jesse Helms and Pete Wilson, to name but a few, take advantage of this division which the capitalist class understands and manipulates only too well-using racism effectively to divide the working-class. At this point you might be asking yourselves: Doesn't racism pre-date capitalism? Here we agree with Callinicos that the heterophobia associated with precapitalist societies was not the same as modern racism. Pre-capitalist slave and feudal societies of classical Greece and Rome did not rely on racism to justify the use of slaves. The Greeks and Romans did not have theories of white superiority. If they did, that must have been unsettling news to Septimus Severus, Roman Emperor from Ad 193 to 211, who was, many historians claim, a black man. Racism emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a key development of capitalism-colonial plantations in the New World where slave labour stolen from Africa was used to produce tobacco, sugar, and cotton for the global consumer market (Callinicos, 1993). Callinicos cites Eric Williams who remarks: 'Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery' (cited in Callinicos, 1993, p. 24). In effect, racism emerged as the ideology of the plantocracy. It began with the class of sugar-planters and slave merchants that dominated England's Caribbean colonies. Racism developed out of the 'systemic slavery' of the New World. The 'natural inferiority' of Africans was a way that Whites justified enslaving them. According to Callinicos: Racism offers white workers the comfort of believing themselves part of the dominant group; it also provides, in times of crisis, a ready-made scapegoat, in the shape of the oppressed group. Racism thus gives white workers a particular identity, and one which unites them with white capitalists. We have here, then, a case of the kind of 'imagined community' discussed by Benedict Anderson in his influential analysis of nationalism. (1993, p. 38) In short, to abolish racism in any substantive sense, we need to abolish global capitalism.

#### The history of slavery proves that race is merely a symptom of capital—any discussion of racism must first start at the violent history of capital accumulation.

Keefer 3 (Tom, member of Facing Reality, New Socialist Magazine, January 2003, “Constructs of Capitalism: Slavery and the Development of Racism”,

<http://www.newsocialist.org/magazine/39/article03.html>, RSR)

The brutality and viciousness of capitalism is well known to the oppressed and exploited of this world. Billions of people throughout the world spend their lives incessantly toiling to enrich the already wealthy, while throughout history any serious attempts to build alternatives to capitalism have been met with bombings, invasions, and blockades by imperialist nation states. Although the modern day ideologues of the mass media and of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF never cease to inveigh against scattered acts of violence perpetrated against their system, they always neglect to mention that the capitalist system they lord over was called into existence and has only been able to maintain itself by the sustained application of systematic violence. It should come as no surprise that this capitalist system, which we can only hope is now reaching the era of its final demise, was just as rapacious and vicious in its youth as it is now. The "rosy dawn" of capitalist production was inaugurated by the process of slavery and genocide in the western hemisphere, and this "primitive accumulation of capital" resulted in the largest systematic murder of human beings ever seen. However, the rulers of society have found that naked force is often most economically used in conjunction with ideologies of domination and control which provide a legitimizing explanation for the oppressive nature of society. Racism is such a construct and it came into being as a social relation which condoned and secured the initial genocidal processes of capitalist accumulation--the founding stones of contemporary bourgeois society. While it is widely accepted that the embryonic capitalist class came to power in the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, what is comparatively less well known is the crucial role that chattel slavery and the plunder of the "New World" played in calling this class into being and providing the "primitive accumulation of capital" necessary to launch and sustain industrialization in Europe. The accidental "discovery" of the Western Hemisphere by the mass murderer Christopher Columbus in 1492 changed everything for the rival economic and political interests of the European states. The looting and pillaging of the "New World" destabilized the European social order, as Spain raised huge armies and built armadas with the unending streams of gold and silver coming from the "New World", the spending of which devalued the currency reserves of its rivals. The only way Portugal, England, Holland, and France could stay ahead in the regional power games of Europe was to embark on their own colonial ventures. In addition to the extraction of precious minerals and the looting and pillaging of indigenous societies, European merchant-adventurers realized that substantial profits could also be made through the production of cash crops on the fertile lands surrounding the Caribbean sea. The only problem was that as the indigenous population either fled from enslavement or perished from the diseases and deprivations of the Europeans, there was no one left to raise the sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and other tropical cash crops that were so profitable. A system of waged labour would not work for the simple reason that with plentiful land and easy means of subsistence surrounding them, colonists would naturally prefer small scale homesteading instead of labouring for their masters. As the planter Emanuel Downing of Massachusetts put it in 1645: "I do not see how we can thrive until we get a stock of slaves sufficient to do all our business, for our children's children will hardly see this great continent filled with people so that our servants will still desire freedom to plant for themselves, and not stay but for very great wages." Capitalistic social relations have always been based on compulsion, and they require as a precondition that workers possess nothing but their capacity to labour. The would-be developers of the wealth of the "New World" thus turned to forced labour in complete contradiction to all the theories of bourgeois economists because unfree labour was the only kind of labour applicable to the concrete situation in the Americas. Although slavery is now, and has almost always been equated with unfree Black labour, it was not always, or even predominantly so. Capitalists looked first to their own societies in order to find the population to labour in servitude on the large-scale plantations necessary for tropical cash crop production. Eric Williams, in his groundbreaking work Capitalism and Slavery, noted that in the early stages of colonialism "white slavery was the historic base upon which Negro [sic] slavery was constructed." Between 1607 and 1783 over a quarter million "white" indentured servants arrived in the British colonies alone where they were set to work in the agricultural and industrial processes of the time. The shipping companies, ports, and trading routes established for the transport of the poor, "criminal", and lumpen elements of European society were to form the backbone of the future slave trade of Africans. Slavery became an exclusively Black institution due to the dynamics of class struggle as repeated multi-ethnic rebellions of African slaves and indentured European servants led the slaveholders to seek strategies to divide and conquer. The fact that an African slave could be purchased for life with the same amount of money that it would cost to buy an indentured servant for 10 years, and that the African's skin color would function as an instrument of social control by making it easier to track down runaway slaves in a land where all whites were free wage labourers and all Black people slaves, provided further incentives for this system of racial classification. In the colonies where there was an insufficient free white population to provide a counterbalance to potential slave insurgencies, such as on the Caribbean islands, an elaborate hierarchy of racial privilege was built up, with the lighter skinned "mulattos" admitted to the ranks of free men where they often owned slaves themselves. The concept of a "white race" never really existed before the economic systems of early capitalism made it a necessary social construct to aid in the repression of enslaved Africans. Xenophobia and hostility towards those who were different than one's own immediate family, clan, or tribe were certainly evident, and discrimination based on religious status was also widespread but the development of modern "scientific" racism with its view that there are physically distinct "races" within humanity, with distinct attributes and characteristics is peculiar to the conquest of the Americas, the rise of slavery, and the imperialist domination of the entire world. Racism provided a convenient way to explain the subordinate position of Africans and other victims of Euro-colonialism, while at the same time providing an apparatus upon which to structure the granting of special privileges to sectors of the working class admitted as members of the "white race". As David McNally has noted, one of the key component of modern racism was its utility in resolving the contradiction as to how the modern European societies in which the bourgeoisie had come to power through promising "freedom" and "equality" were so reliant on slave labour and murderous, yet highly profitable colonial adventures. The development of a concept like racism allowed whole sections of the world's population to be "excommunicated" from humankind, and then be murdered or worked to death with a clear conscience for the profit of the capitalist class. To get a sense of the scale of slavery and its economic importance, and thus an understanding of the material incentives for the creation of ideological constructs such as "race", a few statistics regarding the English slave trade from Eric Williams' book Capitalism and Slavery help to put things in context. The Royal African Company, a monopolistic crown corporation, transported an average of 5 000 slaves a year between 1680 and 1686. When the ability to engage in the free trade of slaves was recognized as a "fundamental and natural right" of the Englishman, one port city alone, Bristol, shipped 160 950 slaves from 1698-1707. In 1760, 146 slave ships with a capacity for 36 000 slaves sailed from British ports, while in 1771 that number had increased to 190 ships with a capacity for 47 000 slaves. Between 1700 and 1786 over 610 000 slaves were imported to Jamaica alone, and conservative estimates for the total import of slaves into all British colonies between 1680 and 1786 are put at over two million. All told, many historians place the total number of Africans displaced by the Atlantic slave trade as being between twelve and thirty million people--a massive historical event and forced migration of unprecedented proportions. These large numbers of slaves and the success of the slave trade as jump starter for capitalist industrialization came from what has been called the "triangular trade"--an intensely profitable economic relationship which built up European industry while systematically deforming and underdeveloping the other economic regions involved. The Europeans would produce manufactured goods that would then be traded to ruling elites in the various African kingdoms. They in turn would use the firearms and trading goods of the Europeans to enrich themselves by capturing members of rival tribes, or the less fortunate of their own society, to sell them as slaves to the European merchants who would fill their now empty ships with slaves destined to work in the colonial plantations. On the plantations, the slaves would toil to produce expensive cash crops that could not be grown in Europe. These raw materials were then refined and sold at fantastic profit in Europe. In 1697, the tiny island of Barbados with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined, while by 1798, the income accruing to the British from the West Indian plantations alone was four million pounds a year, as opposed to one million pounds from the whole rest of the world. Capitalist economists of the day recognized the super profitability of slavery by noting the ease of making 100% profit on the trade, and by noting that one African slave was as profitable as seven workers in the mainland. Even more importantly, the profits of the slave trade were plowed back into further economic growth. Capital from the slave trade financed James Watt and the invention and production of the steam engine, while the shipping, insurance, banking, mining, and textile industries were all thoroughly integrated into the slave trade. What an analysis of the origins of modern capitalism shows is just how far the capitalist class will go to make a profit. The development of a pernicious racist ideology, spread to justify the uprooting and enslavement of millions of people to transport them across the world to fill a land whose indigenous population was massacred or worked to death, represents the beginnings of the system that George W. Bush defends as "our way of life". For revolutionaries today who seek to understand and transform capitalism and the racism encoded into its very being, it is essential to understand how and why these systems of domination and exploitation came into being before we can hope to successfully overthrow them.

## 1NR

#### Prioritizing Epistemology/Ontology creates a vacuous and inaccurate conception of international relations.

Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Southampton, ‘2

 [David, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 2002 31: 653 Sage Journals Online]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that **‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology”** often **signals this philosophical turn**’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, **such a** philosophical **turn is not without its dangers** and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that **it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter** two **were merely a simple function of the former.** But while **the explanatory and**/or **interpretive power of a theoretical account is not** wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, **wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments.** Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, **be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful** in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, i**f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us.** In other words, **while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind**. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction** from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: **since** it is the case that **there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions** of a given action, event or phenomenon, **the challenge is to decide which is the most apt** i**n terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action**, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘**theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5** **The justification** offered for this strategy **rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms.** However, as Shapiro points out**, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science** since ‘**whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’**.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that **the preceding** two **combine to encourage the formation of a** particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the **Highlander view’**—namely, **an image of warring theoretical approaches** with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because **the** turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right,** namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. **This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.**

#### Policy making should be our first priority - they cause paradigm wars.

Wendt, 3rd Most Influential Scholar of IR in the World According to Survey of 1084 IR Scholars, ‘98

[Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association, p. 115-116]

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method. Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

#### Their epistemology K makes large-scale consequences MORE important. Reason the K outweighs.

Cowen, Holbert C. Harris Chair of economics as a professor at George Mason University, ‘6

[Tyler, December 2006, “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism,” Utilitas, 18:4, p. 394-396]

SOME PHILOSOPHIC CONCLUSIONS

The epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call 'big event consequentialism'. In this view, we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. This includes stopping the use of nuclear weapons, saving children from smallpox, making progress against global poverty, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. Big events, as I define them, typically are of significant practical importance, involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast, consider 'small events'. Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in refiective equilibrium. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are relevant. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior. In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits. Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all or some) other values. For instance arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures." A very large number of'muzak and potato' lives do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization.^^ Rawls put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons.^^ For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to matter. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons. Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.^" To sum up these points, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: 'We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much, relative to other factors, such as deontology or virtue ethics. We should abandon consequentialist morality.' But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those which carry values with some lexical properties, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS Given big event consequentialism, our policy choices should be directed toward achieving big events, especially if they have partially lexical properties. Many policies do pursue goals of this kind, such as poverty reduction, world peace, and preventing environmental collapse. Furthermore, we should persist in striving for such goals. As we struggle for great achievements, along the way we will encounter many incidental costs and obstacles. We are not certain how much weight we should attach to these costs, just as we were not sure how to value the dog's broken leg in the D-Day example, given the high generic uncertainty attached to our choices. But we now learn that these incidental costs may be less important than we had thought.

#### This turns affirmative’s advocacy - obsession for catastrophic disaster is the root cause of their criticism- in order to fulfill their moral appetite, they recreate the problems outlined in the 1ac to play the savior. This cycle is inescapable under their mindset.

Baudrillard, 1994 (Jean, Prof of Philosophy @ European graduate school, The Illusion of The End, pg. 67-69)

In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d'Alliance\* for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). **We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen**. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this **catastrophic cannibalism**, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself-reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, **the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself** , **in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite to symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food.** It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the **hallucinogenic misery** which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The ‘disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbering in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of miser and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitelv.